Abstract 

This article examines the regulation of crypto assets. Technological progress accelerates the transformation of prevailing regulatory structures and triggers a re-evaluation of regulatory strategies. This article also provides an analysis to the approach by courts in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Singapore in granting jurisdictional gateway, exceptions to traditional methods of service of documents, and the viability of claims against unknown persons. To better understand the impact of the lack of regulation, this article also discusses the putative fiduciary relationship between cryptocurrencies network developers and users. Finally, this article suggests possible ways of regulating this field.

Keywords: Blockchain, Crypto, Cryptocurrency, Cryptocurrencies, Fiduciary Relationship, Jurisdictional Gateway, Non-fungible Token (‘NFT’), NFT Airdrop, Persons Unknown.

I. INTRODUCTION

In less than a year, from May 2022 to January 2023, six major cryptocurrencies platforms collapsed – Luna,[1] Celsius, Voyager Digital, BlockFi, Genesis and FTX.[2] The collapse of FTX alone vapourised US$8 billion.[3] Investors were left stranded, regulators scrambled to respond, and courts found themselves ruling in unchartered terrain. These events are fuelling calls for regulation.[4]

In recent years, there has been a significant expansion in these virtual currencies. Not only do they exhibit a high degree of volatility and financial risks, but they also spell an evolution in our global financial system. Accordingly, this article studies the approach taken by several nations at the forefront of crypto regulation.

To start off, crypto assets are digital representation of values that are stored and transferred on the distributed ledger technology, which permits digital transactions without a centralised authority (a central monetary authority[5]).[6] Cryptocurrencies are one such asset. Other examples include Central Bank Digital Currencies (‘CBDC’s) and Non-Fungible Tokens (‘NFT’s).[7]

What distinguishes cryptocurrencies from conventional payment systems are the ‘decentralised’ and ‘trustless’ system of the former. In decentralised systems, there are no intermediaries who controls the system.[8] In trustless systems, participants do not have to trust any individual entity, the system is presumed to be trustworthy itself.[9] All transactions of cryptocurrencies will be recorded on a public ledger, which is known as the ‘blockchain’.[10] Using this technology, participants can confirm transactions without a need for a central clearing authority.[11] By doing this, the network of participants (referred to as nodes) then collaboratively maintain the ledger.[12]

However, innovation opens the door to uncharted legal terrain. The decentralised nature of cryptocurrencies, combined with the speed and irreversibility of transactions, as well as the ease of cross-border transfers, have made them attractive to criminal actors.[13] Given the irreversibility of cryptocurrencies – stemming from the absence of intermediaries to reverse unauthorised transactions like thefts and bugs – cryptocurrency thefts are more common and severe than thefts in conventional financial systems.[14]

To provide better visualisation, in 2024 alone, the most prevalent cryptocurrency crimes are the hacking of cryptocurrency platforms[15] and cryptocurrency investment scams.[16] Also, in early 2022, the sharp decline in cryptocurrency values triggered a surge in crypto-related litigation in the United States. By May 2022, over 200 lawsuits had been filed — reflecting a 50% increase since the beginning of 2020.[17] This story is still developing.

Turning to Malaysia, it is legal to mine, trade, and pay zakat[18] using cryptocurrencies.[19]Malaysia’s regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies is underpinned by the Securities Commission Malaysia (‘SC’). The SC regulates cryptocurrencies via the Capital Markets and Services (Prescription of Securities) (Digital Currency and Digital Token) Order 2019 which allows for the offering and trading of digital assets, while also requiring digital asset service providers to register with the SC.[20] Meanwhile, although Bank Negara Malaysia (‘BNM’), the central bank, has been working on cryptocurrency-related policies and regulations since 2018,[21] it maintains that it does not regulate cryptocurrencies and does not recognise them as legal tender.[22] Accordingly, crypto regulations in Malaysia are in its infancy. Put differently, the cryptocurrency market is largely unregulated. Malaysian courts are thus thrusted with the duty to address grievances in the cryptocurrency space.

Globally, jurisdictions encounter significant challenges when dealing with cases involving information gathering claims from fraud victims. These cases often involve exchanges located in foreign jurisdictions or fraudsters whose identities are initially unknown. Additionally, navigating claims across numerous offshore jurisdictions and enforcing judgments, especially in relation to proprietary claims involving the tracing of assets through a network of foreign-registered entities, presents further complexities.

Hence, this article submits that clear guidelines are urgently required in crypto regulations, given the unpredictability of crypto exchanges. In this study, we explore the development of crypto litigation in the United States, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and the possible applications in Malaysia.

II. JURISDICTION COMPLEXITY IN CRYPTO LITIGATION

The inherent decentralised nature of blockchain technology introduces complexities to the existing legal system, specifically in relation to court jurisdiction and applicable laws. Its decentralisation enables it to operate through a dispersed collective of individuals rather than a centralised entity. Consequently, determining the precise jurisdiction for legal purposes becomes a challenging endeavour. As pointed out in Williams & Glyn’s Bank plc v Astro Dinamico Compania Naviera SA, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton held that ‘logically the court must decide whether it has jurisdiction before it can go on to consider any other question in the action’.[23]

In order to invoke a jurisdictional gateway over foreign parties with possible conflicting regulatory frameworks and legal enforcement ¾ while at the same time avoiding infringement on state sovereignty, the plaintiffs must first prove that their claims have a sufficient degree of merit. Courts across the globe have taken differing approaches in deciding this.

A. The United States

The United States (‘US’) has the most comprehensive case law and experience in crypto-related litigation. The courts have adopted a ‘purposeful direction test’ to rule on personal jurisdiction against foreign companies in crypto disputes.[24]       

The first case that dealt with the issue of jurisdiction over a crypto exchange based overseas is In Re Tezos.[25] In this case, the Defendants and their company were based in Northern California and operated by exchanging their own cryptocurrency with Bitcoin and Ether ¾ which was invested in by the Plaintiff. The US resident Plaintiff discovered that the company was issuing unregistered securities and brought a claim in the US to recover the crypto funds. The question posed to the court was whether it could exercise jurisdiction against the Defendants.

In the US, there are two ways to establish personal jurisdiction against a defendant who does not reside in the forum state. First is by way of general jurisdiction, where the defendant has a continuous and systematic presence within a specific state.[26] Secondly is specific jurisdiction, where the defendant has minimum contacts with the state in which that court sits.[27] This means that the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the forum state. Such jurisdiction must ‘not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’[28] and the litigation must result from alleged injuries that arise out of, or relate to the defendant’s activities directed at the forum. The court in In Re Tezos focused on specific jurisdiction.

The landmark case for establishing personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in the US is International Shoe.[29] In that case, the Supreme Court introduced the ‘minimum contacts’ standard, holding that a defendant may be subject to a state's jurisdiction if it has ‘sufficient minimum contacts’ with the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction ‘will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’.[30] Building upon this standard, various courts have developed a three-part test to determine specific personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants.

The most notable is perhaps the case of Boschetto v Hansing, concerning the transaction of goods on an online consumer-to-consumer trading portal, eBay.[31] In reaching its conclusion on the lack of personal jurisdiction, the court adopted a three-part test from Schwarzenegger v Fred Martin Motor Co.[32] Firstly, the defendants must purposefully avail themselves of the privileges of conducting activities within the forum state. Secondly, the claim must relate to the defendant’s activities. Thirdly, it must be reasonable and just to the defendant for the court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. The court further held that the burden of proof for the first two prongs is on the plaintiff and only then the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the ‘exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable’.

In In Re Tezos, the first prong is satisfied as the Defendants engaged in little to no marketing of their business elsewhere other than in the US, and most of their investors are also from that country. The second prong is met by the Defendants’ decision to build a US-hosted website and to structure their business to accommodate  US-based participation. With that being said, the court found that the US is a reasonable jurisdiction to hear the dispute.

As of today, the courts remain the bulwark for crypto regulation in the US. While the GENIUS Act of 2025 – a first-of-its-kind bill to regulate parts of the cryptocurrency industry – was introduced recently, it failed to pass through the Senate on 8 May 2025.[33]

The US courts would generally look at the main marketing place of the crypto exchange to determine jurisdiction. On the other hand, English courts prefer to look at the rightful owner's domicile and the location where the damage occurred.

B. The United Kingdom

As for claims made in the United Kingdom (‘UK’), the plaintiffs must make an application to the court for permission to serve out of the jurisdiction. Three requirements must be satisfied:[34]

(1) the claim has reasonable prospects of success;

(2) the claim is a good arguable case that passes through one or more of the jurisdictional gateways set out in Practice Direction 6B;[35] and

(3) England and Wales is the proper jurisdiction to bring the claim (often referred to as the forum conveniens). The Court will take into account matters relevant to convenience and expense, such as the availability of evidence and witnesses, the law governing the dispute, and the place where the parties reside or carry on business among other factors.

1.Reasonable prospect of success

In Vitkovice Horni A Hutni Tezirstvo v Korner,[36] Lord Simonds opined that the interpretation of the words ‘good cause of action’ means ‘good arguable case’. Hence, the Plaintiff need not satisfy the court that he or she is right. The Plaintiff’s burden is only to make it ‘sufficiently to appear ... that the case is a proper one for service out of the jurisdiction under this Order’.[37] This is because of Rule 6.37(1)(b) of the English Civil Procedural Rules, which stipulates an additional obligation on the applicant to set out that the claim has a reasonable prospect of success when applying to the English courts for service out of jurisdiction. However, it is a trite principle that the court does not engage in complex questions of law or fact at the interlocutory stage.

2. Are crypto assets property?

The English courts have resorted to recognise crypto assets as property to ease the determination of jurisdiction. This serves as an important reassurance to investors of cryptocurrencies as it allows them to seek ownership rights over their digital holdings, similar to other types of assets.[38] Properties are traditionally classified into choses in possession and choses in action. In Colonial Bank v Whinney[39] (per Fry LJ), it was held that ‘All personal things are either in possession or action. The law knows no tertium quid between the two.’ However, crypto assets are neither choses in possession, for they are virtual, intangible, and cannot be possessed – nor are they choses in action, for they do not embody any right capable of being enforced by action. Hence, such acknowledgement presents significant consequences in crypto litigation, including but not limited to the following:

(1) showing that there is at least a realistically arguable case;

(2) establishing that crypto assets are capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction;

(3) that the rightful owner can exercise property ownership rights over the crypto assets;

(4) that gateway 11 of Practice Direction 6B which provides that ‘the subject matter of the claim relates wholly or principally to property within the jurisdiction…’ is applicable; and

(5) that gateway 15 of Practice Direction 6B which establishes constructive or resulting trust on claims that ‘(a) arises out of acts committed or events occurring within the jurisdiction; (b) relates to assets within the jurisdiction; or (c) is governed by the law of England and Wales.’

The landmark decision in National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth[40] (per Lord Wilberforce) set out four characteristics of a property, which have been cited with approval by the court in AA v Persons unknown.[41] In this case, the court recognised crypto assets as property on the basis that crypto assets meet the four criteria set out in Ainsworth as being ¾ (1) definable; (2) identifiable by third parties; (3) capable in their nature of assumption by parties; and (4) having some degree of permanence. Other courts have also recognised crypto assets as a type of property under English law.[42]

Besides that, in November 2019, the UK Jurisdiction Taskforce (‘UKJT’), led by Sir Geoffrey Vos (Chancellor of the High Court and Chair of the UKJT), issued its ‘Legal Statement on Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts’[43] examining whether English law considers certain crypto assets as property. The UKJT defined crypto assets by key characteristics, including intangibility, cryptographic authentication, use of distributed transaction ledgers, decentralisation, and rule by consensus. According to the UKJT, crypto assets possess all the essential qualities of property, and their unique features do not disqualify them from being classified as such.[44] Moreover, the UKJT specified that their classification as property should not hinge on whether they can be categorised as things in possession or things in action. As a result of its analysis, the UKJT concluded that, in principle, crypto assets can be treated as property under English law.

Similarly, the Supreme Court of British Columbia has also recognised Ethereum ¾ a type of cryptocurrency ¾ as a species of property susceptible to the property law doctrines of conversion and wrongful detention.[45]

The approach adopted by the UK courts has been followed by the Singapore courts, which will be discussed below.

3. Establishing jurisdiction by referring to the rightful owner’s domicile before the fraud

Until recently, English courts have generally accepted that there is an arguable case that the domicile of the rightful owner determines the location of intangible crypto assets.[46] Consequently, if the owner is domiciled in England, the assets are considered to be within the jurisdiction of English courts.[47] This implies that the determination of whether crypto assets fall within the local courts' jurisdiction is made before the assets were stolen from the rightful owner and moved outside the jurisdiction.

The first decided case in the UK in relation to the lex situs for a crypto asset is the case of Ion Science v Persons Unknown.[48] In this case, it was ruled that the lex situs of a crypto asset is the place where the rightful owner is domiciled and that the location of the contended cryptocurrency was in England prior to the transfer.[49] However, this rule has been further relaxed to include residence.[50] It is also proposed that the transaction of cryptocurrency shall be:

‘Governed by the law of the country where the participant resides or carries on business at the relevant time or, if the participant resides or carries on business in more than one place at that time, by the law of the place of residence or business of the participant with which the participation that is the object of the transaction is most closely connected.’[51]

By pinpointing the main business location to establish the most appropriate forum for hearing the claim, this reflects the position in the US as discussed in the previous chapter.  

Similarly, in Fetch.ai Ltd v Persons Unknown,[52] the English court granted permission to an English-registered company whose cryptocurrencies had been stolen to serve court documents out of jurisdiction on the fraudsters. This was on the basis that ‘it is at least realistically arguable’[53] that the Plaintiff’s stolen cryptocurrency was located in England. The court opted for gateway 15(b), which is that the claim related to assets within the jurisdiction, to serve the claim form out of the jurisdiction. Put differently, the test in this case for determining whether assets are within the jurisdiction – particularly for the purpose of deciding whether a claim relates to such assets – focuses on where the assets were located before the justiciable act occurred.

Subsequently, the court in D’Aloia v Persons Unknown[54] granted permission to the English-domiciled plaintiff to serve court documents out of jurisdiction on the fraudsters because ‘the claimant was at all material times domiciled in England, and, as such, the USDT and USDC [cryptocurrencies] of which he was deprived by the fraudulent misrepresentation of … the persons unknown, was located in England.’[55]

However, a subsequent High Court decision in Osbourne v Persons Unknown[56] (‘Osbourne’) questioned the interpretation of gateway 15(b) by the court in Fetch.ai Ltd v Persons Unknown.[57] The court suggests that it may not be sufficient that the relevant property or assets are within the jurisdiction when the cause of action arose. Rather, the question of whether property is within jurisdiction is to be determined when the application is made for permission to serve the claim form out of the jurisdiction, not when the cause of action arose.[58]

To provide some context, in Osbourne,[59] the two NFTs were initially transferred out of the Plaintiff’s wallet without the Plaintiff’s knowledge, then transferred at least four times to different wallets. The court held that the first transaction could fall within gateway 15(b) – the claim relates to assets within the jurisdiction – but not the subsequent transactions, as it is doubtful whether England and Wales remained the situs of the two NFTs.[60]

Nonetheless, the court granted permission for service of the claim documents out of jurisdiction under gateway 15(c), i.e., the claim was governed by the law of England and Wales. This is because the constructive trust created upon the first hacker was governed by English law and, consequently, the constructive trust created upon the subsequent recipients was also governed by English law.[61]

With that said, the interpretation of gateway 15(b) in Osbourne presents particular challenges to victims of fraud or theft of crypto assets, given the ease and speed at which such assets may be transferred internationally. While the court did not definitively rule on the issue of the location of the crypto assets,[62] it remains to be seen whether English courts will continue to base their jurisdiction on the domicile of the individual possessing the crypto assets. Nonetheless, it now appears that this is not a satisfactory approach.

Therefore, when establishing jurisdiction in cases involving claims related to cryptocurrency, English courts would treat crypto assets as property and take into account the location of those crypto assets when assessing the viability of a claim.

C. The Republic of Singapore

1. Existence of jurisdiction over the claim and service out of jurisdiction

Generally, jurisdiction exists as of right over a defendant present in Singapore, but jurisdiction over a foreign defendant is subject to the court’s discretion.[63] The requirements for a service of an originating process out of Singapore is divided into two instruments, namely, the Rules of Court 2014 (‘ROC 2014’)[64] and the Rules of Court 2021 (‘ROC 2021’),[65] depending on when the claim is filed in the court.

Regarding the ROC 2014, the landmark case is Zoom Communications Ltd v Broadcast Solutions Pte Ltd,[66] decided by the Singapore Court of Appeal. The criteria for valid service out of jurisdiction are well established, namely:

(a) the plaintiff’s claim must fall under one of the heads of claim in Order 11 Rule 1 of the ROC 2014[67];

(b) the plaintiff’s claim must have a sufficient degree of merit; and

(c) Singapore must be the proper forum for the trial of the action.

The requirement of a case with sufficient degree of merit refers to a good arguable case. A good arguable case is, as per Mustill J, one which is ‘more than barely capable of serious argument, but not necessarily one which the judge considers would have a better than 50 per cent chance of success’.[68]

At this stage of determining whether there is a good arguable case, it is trite that the court does not engage in complex questions of law or fact at the interlocutory stage.[69] In respect of an application for an interlocutory proprietary injunction, the first requirement of showing that there is a serious question to be tried will be satisfied as long as ‘the plaintiffs have a seriously arguable case that they [have] a proprietary interest’.[70]

With regards to the final point of determining if Singapore is the proper forum, the two-stage test as established in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd[71] is employed. First, the test asks whether a court shall reject jurisdiction over a case due to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, where there is another jurisdiction which is more appropriate and convenient to hear the case. The factors to be considered include the dispute’s governing law,[72] the location of evidence and witnesses,[73] and whether any parallel proceedings are pending elsewhere.[74] Second, if the answer to the first stage is affirmative, the court shall consider the basis for it to hear the case in its forum instead. This two-stage test is also adopted in the jurisdictions of Canada,[75] New Zealand,[76] and Hong Kong.[77]

Since the claim must come under one of the heads of claim in Order 11, Rule 1, the case of Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v Bhavani Stores Pte Ltd[78] held that:

‘… Where … the court’s jurisdiction is premised on Order 11, the burden of proving that Singapore is the appropriate forum falls on the plaintiff and this remains the case even when the defendant (served out of jurisdiction) comes to Singapore to contest the jurisdiction of the Singapore court.’

This article contends that placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove that that Singapore is the proper forum is fair and just, as the exercise of jurisdiction by Singaporean courts over a foreign defendant is an imposition upon them.[79]

The new ROC 2021 then makes it unnecessary for a plaintiff to scrutinise the long list of permissible cases set out in the ROC 2014 in the hope of fitting into one or more descriptions. It has simplified the gateways in Order 11 Rule 1(a)-(t) of the ROC 2014 into merely two ways, namely, either with the court’s approval or a service out of Singapore is allowed under a contract between the parties.[80] Nonetheless, although not legally binding, Singaporean courts have always interpret the gateways for a service out of jurisdiction with Practice Direction 63 (‘PD 63’), which is an instrument issued by the courts to supplement the ROC.[81] All the jurisdictional gateways under ROC 2014, Order 11 Rule 1(a)–(t) are incorporated in PD 63. Accordingly, despite the new ROC 2021, the gateways continue to play broadly the same role that they did under ROC 2014.[82]           

The Singapore courts have had a chance to deal with litigation concerning the misappropriation of cryptocurrencies in the remarkably unprecedented case of CLM v CLN and others (‘CLM’).[83] This case saw the Singapore High Court creatively manoeuvring conservative legal rules to suit the needs of modern technology. Indeed, multiple novel issues have been decided. To point to one, Singapore’s first freezing injunction against persons unknown was granted in this case.

In CLM, the crypto coins of the Plaintiff, a citizen of the United States of America, have been stolen by persons unknown and were moved to digital wallets that were controlled by cryptocurrency exchanges with operations in Singapore. Taking heed from Zoom Communications, CLM adopted the same principles to serve out of jurisdiction. The court held that the case has satisfied the first criterion in that the Defendants have owned subsidiaries in Singapore, and they therefore have assets in Singapore in the form of shares in these subsidiaries. Hence, the requirement under Order 11, Rule 1(a) of the ROC that the person is domiciled, ordinarily resident, carrying on business, or has property in Singapore is satisfied.

Next, for the second criterion concerning a sufficient degree of merit, the court held that the Plaintiff must prove that there is a serious question to be tried on the merits of the claim.[84] Again, this was met on the basis that the Defendants had registered new accounts for the sole purposes of dissipating the stolen assets.

The court referred to the two-stage test as established in Spiliada Maritime Corp and affirmed in Siemens AG v Holdrich Investment Ltd[85] to decide on the third requirement – whether Singapore is the proper forum. With regards to this, Siemens AG held that it is unnecessary:  

‘for a plaintiff who seeks leave for service out of jurisdiction to show that Singapore is ‘clearly’ the forum conveniens if, by this, it is meant that Singapore must be not only the most appropriate forum in the final analysis, but also the most appropriate forum by far.’[86]

This is because, in litigations involving connecting factors to several jurisdictions, requiring a forum to be clearly the most appropriate forum would necessarily condemn the dispute to jurisdictional limbo. Thus, it is sufficient for a plaintiff seeking leave for service out of jurisdiction to show that Singapore is, on balance and in the final analysis, the most appropriate forum to try the dispute. In CLM, since the Defendants were based in Singapore and have owned subsidiaries there, it is sufficient proof that Singapore is the most appropriate forum to try that matter.

2. Proprietary injunction

In the subsequent case of Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (‘Janesh’),[87] the court allowed the Plaintiff to serve out of jurisdiction on the fraudster of the plaintiff’s NFT, on the grounds that the Plaintiff ‘was located in Singapore, and carried on his business here’.[88]

The Plaintiffs in both CLM and Janesh have pleaded for a proprietary injunction to prohibit the fraudsters from dealing with, disposing of, or diminishing the value of the cryptocurrencies and NFT. To obtain such an injunction, the Plaintiffs must establish the two requirements as set out in Bouvier, Yves Charles Edgar and another v Accent Delight International Ltd and another and another appeal.[89] These are:

(a) There is a serious question to be tried; and

(b) The balance of convenience lies in favour of granting the injunction.

This is a simplified rule which originates from an English House of Lords decision in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd.[90] With regards to the first criterion, the Singapore courts have discussed whether cryptocurrencies and NFTs were capable of giving rise to proprietary rights that warrant protection via a proprietary injunction.

As for cryptocurrencies, the court in CLM have applied the test as established in National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth[91] in that cryptocurrencies are (1) definable; (2) identifiable by third parties; (3) capable in their nature of assumption by parties; and (4) having some degree of permanence. Thus, Singapore and the UK have the same approach in treating cryptocurrencies as a property right.

It is perhaps useful to illustrate the reasoning by a New Zealand High Court decision in Ruscoe v Cryptopia Ltd (in Liquidation)[92] (‘Ruscoe’) (Gendall J) where it was held that cryptocurrencies, as digital assets, are a form of property that are capable of being held on trust. Besides that, it was also held that cryptocurrencies are not information:

‘[I]t is wrong in any event to regard cryptocurrencies as mere information because:

(a) The whole purpose behind cryptocurrencies is to create an item of tradeable value not simply to record or to impart in confidence knowledge or information. Although cryptocoins are not backed by the promise of a bank, the combination of data that records their existence and affords them exclusivity is otherwise comparable to the electronic records of a bank. The use of the private key also provides a method of transferring that value. This might be seen as similar in operation to, for example, a PIN on an electronic bank account.

(b) And, generally, as I see it, cryptocoins are no more mere information than the words of a contract are. What allows a contract to be capable of being an item of property is not the words nor even the binding promise which is only a personal obligation, but the fact that equity recognises there is a unique relationship between the parties created by the words and then supplies a system for transferring the contractual rights. Similarly, a unique relationship and system of transfer exists with respect to the relevant data on the blockchain that makes up a cryptocoin.

(c) In Boardman v Phipps Lord Upjohn stated: ‘In general, information is not property at all. It is normally open to all who have eyes to read and ears to hear.’ This statement appears to confirm as a principle for not regarding information as property the fact that it can be infinitely duplicated. Again, this is not true of cryptocoins where every public key recording the data constituting the coin is unique on the system where it is recorded. It is also protected by the associated private key from being transferred without consent.’[93]

In respect of NFTs, it is useful to delve into the nature of NFTs first. NFTs are represented by a string of code using a ‘smart contract’. When an NFT is sold, the program would use this string of code to create a new token in the seller’s crypto wallet address, which can then be transferred to the purchaser’s crypto wallet. NFTs have been described as certificates of ownership ‘powered by smart contracts and protected by blockchain technology’.[94]

An NFT contains a link to the server where the actual image itself can be found. It is, essentially, a string of code which includes code for the image itself. Taking heed from Ruscoe above, NFTs are not mere information; they are data encoded in a certain manner and securely stored on the blockchain ledger.[95] Indeed, labeling NFTs as mere data disregards the distinctive connection between the encoded information and the blockchain technology, which facilitates the secure and verifiable transfer of this data from one user to another. This is because the strings of code representing NFTs do not provide any knowledge to those who have read it. ‘It provides instructions to the computer under a system whereby the ‘owner’ of the NFT has exclusive control over its transfer from his wallet to any other wallet.’[96] Therefore, like cryptocurrencies, NFTs have satisfied the first limb of the test as set out in Bouvier in that it can be treated as property.

Moving on, the second limb requires the balance of convenience to be in favour of granting the injunction. As held in CLM, this is evaluated by weighing the potential harm the applicant might face if the injunction is not issued, compared to the harm the respondent may experience if the injunction is granted and the applicant's argument is proven false during trial.[97]

In CLM, the balance clearly lies in favour of granting the proprietary injunction. If it were not granted, there would be a real risk that the first defendants would dissipate the stolen crypto, which would prevent the plaintiff from recovering those assets even if he successfully obtained a judgment in his favour.[98]

The same goes to the stolen NFT in Janesh which could not be sufficiently compensated by an award of damages for the loss suffered if the Defendant was allowed to transfer the stolen NFT to other parties. This is because the string of code that represents the stolen NFT on the blockchain is unique.[99] Should the NFT be transferred to third parties, the Plaintiff may be unable to reclaim it, rendering any court-ordered proprietary remedy concerning the stolen NFT futile.  

In conclusion, Singapore courts are not the first in solving crypto disputes. In extending their jurisdiction to crypto claims, the Singapore courts have analysed the jurisprudence across multiple jurisdictions and have acted conservatively in face of this revolutionary technology. Similar to the position in the UK, Singapore courts have recognised cryptocurrencies as property to grant proprietary injunctions to guarantee safe transactions on the blockchain.

III. SERVICE OF COURT DOCUMENTS ON AN UNKNOWN DEFENDANT

Service of legal documents refers to the formal process of delivering legal papers or documents to the parties involved in a legal proceeding. It is an essential part of the legal system that ensures all parties are properly informed and have an opportunity to respond to legal actions or proceedings against them.

The rules governing the service of legal documents vary by jurisdiction, but they generally require that the documents be delivered in a manner that ensures the recipient receives them. This can include personal service, where the documents are handed directly to the recipient, or alternative methods such as certified mail, courier service, or publication in a newspaper, depending on the circumstances and the requirements of the specific case or jurisdiction.

For example, Rules 6.15[100] and 6.27 of the English Civil Procedure Rules allow service of documents by alternative methods not provided within the Rules as long as there is a ‘good reason’ for doing so. In Malaysia, Order 62, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012[101] allows substituted service if the court is satisfied that it is impracticable to serve personally. This is also effectuated in Order 8, Rule 2 of the Singapore Rules of Court 2021[102] which provides a non-exhaustive list of methods to service out of Singapore.

However, recovering 'stolen' crypto assets through court proceedings presents a considerable challenge in terms of serving court documents on the wrongdoers. The nature of crypto 'theft' cases and the inherent complexity of the blockchain makes it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to identify the perpetrators or successfully deliver legal papers to them. These wrongdoers typically remain unknown or actively evade service, as they have little incentive to participate in the court proceedings. There is no other way to contact the fraudster. The English courts have previously permitted alternative approaches, such as those employed by Facebook[103] and WhatsApp.[104] Hence, to suit how the technology functions, the courts have allowed service of documents through an NFT airdrop.

An NFT airdrop refers to the distribution of NFTs to individuals or addresses in a blockchain network.[105] An airdrop, in general, is a method used to distribute tokens or assets to a large number of people, usually for promotional purposes or as a way to distribute tokens fairly among a community. During an NFT airdrop, the NFTs are typically sent directly to the recipients' blockchain addresses.[106]

The first case to significantly circumvent the difficulty in service of documents in crypto and NFT litigations is the New York Supreme Court’s decision in LCX AG v John Doe Nos.[107] The Plaintiff, a crypto asset exchange located in Liechtenstein, filed a lawsuit against multiple unidentified Defendants for allegedly stealing $8 million worth of cryptocurrency from one of its digital wallets. The Supreme Court of New York issued a preliminary injunction and restraining order in favour of the Plaintiff, and it was ordered that the Defendants would be served with a copy of the order by means of a specialised Ethereum-based token delivered through an airdrop to the specified address. This method of service was deemed valid and adequate for establishing jurisdiction under New York law against the individuals who control the address.

LCX AG serves as a revolutionary step in allowing the use of pioneering method for service of legal documents. A few weeks later, the English court also adopted the same ground-breaking method by allowing the injunctive relief, disclosure, and related orders for recovery of cryptocurrencies to be transmitted to the fraudster via NFT airdrop in D’Aloia.[108] This case concerns an alleged theft of cryptocurrency worth around £2 million, and the court determined that employing this method of serving legal documents would likely result in the Defendants being more effectively informed about the order and the subsequent legal proceedings.[109]

Later, in Jones v Persons Unknown,[110] the English High Court authorised the victim of a £1.5 million fraud to serve a summary judgment order on the unidentified fraudsters and the crypto exchange, Huobi, by delivering an NFT through airdrop to the Huobi wallets where the Plaintiff had transferred his Bitcoin. This method of serving legal documents by NFT airdrop was permitted by the court pursuant to Civil Procedure Rules ¾ Rule 6.38. It also made an order for alternative service, finding that this was an exceptional case where traditional means of service were likely to be ineffective.

Other than unknown fraudsters, the Florida District Court in Benjamin Arthur Bowen v Xingzhao Li[111] had allowed the plaintiff to serve documents in the form of an NFT to the known fraudsters who were believed to be situated in the People’s Republic of China. In this case, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants had stolen cryptocurrency of a value of $2,237,268.00 pursuant to a sophisticated global internet cryptocurrency fraud and conversion scheme. The court agreed that serving through an NFT was more likely to reach the Defendants. The Plaintiff had therefore demonstrated a good cause as to why leave should be granted to allow service on the Defendants via NFT.

Using NFTs for serving legal documents to a crypto fraudster offers distinct advantages. While the identity of the thief may remain unknown, their wallet address, a unique alphanumeric code on the blockchain used for transaction verification, is publicly accessible. By embedding a hyperlink within the NFT, the sender can accurately determine when the recipient opens the NFT¾ confirming that the court documents have been viewed. This method proves especially useful for reaching otherwise elusive parties promptly and efficiently. Additionally, the inherent digital nature and non-duplicability of NFTs eliminate concerns about the legal notice being lost or tampered with during delivery which can happen with traditional mailing methods.

IV. JURISDICTION AGAINST PERSONS UNKNOWN

From its inception, the crypto industry has been founded on the principle of anonymity. Maintaining the capability to operate without revealing personal information is a fundamental aspect of crypto technology. Through decentralised ledger systems known as blockchains, all cryptocurrency transactions are recorded, enabling users to conduct transactions without disclosing their identity, avoiding the need to register a bank account or engage with conventional financial intermediaries.[112] As noted by the court in AA v Persons Unknown[113] (Bryan J), such assets are at risk of being moved at ‘…the click of a mouse.’ Perhaps another contemporary risk of movement would be at the tap of a smart phone. Hence, the defendants would often be anonymous or at most represented by a pseudonym.

The question is whether the court has jurisdiction to grant orders against defendants whose identities are unknown. This article comments that requiring strict compliance with the formality requirements of an originating application or claim may well restrict access to justice.

In the UK, the authority to issue orders against unidentified individuals was established in the case of Bloomsbury Publishing Group Ltd and another v News Group Newspapers Ltd and others.[114] In this case, the court granted the Plaintiff's request for an interlocutory injunction against unknown individuals who had acquired copies of an unpublished book. The injunction required these individuals to surrender the copies of the book and prohibited them from disclosing any information obtained from the book to others. The court observed that according to the English Civil Procedure Rules Practice Directions, paragraph 4.1(1) merely requires the title of the proceedings ‘should state … the full name of each party’, and not that a defendant must be named.[115]

The court in Bloomsbury also referred to Rule 3.10 of the Civil Procedure Rules which provides that an error of procedure does not invalidate any step taken in the proceedings unless the court so orders.

Most importantly, Bloomsbury has established the appropriate test to be used in suing an unknown person:

‘… The crucial point, as it seems to me, is that the description used must be sufficiently certain as to identify both those who are included and those who are not. If that test is satisfied then it does not seem to me to matter that the description may apply to no one or to more than one person nor that there is no further element of subsequent identification whether by service or otherwise.’[116]

Consequently, in CMOC v Persons Unknown,[117] the court recognised Bloomsbury as authority for the proposition that the courts have jurisdiction to grant interlocutory injunctions against persons unknown and held that there was ‘no reason in principle against, and indeed a good arguable case for, saying that this should extend to a freezing injunction’.[118] In this case, the Plaintiffs claimed against unidentified Defendants who misappropriated £6.3 million by infiltrating the email account of the Plaintiff’s senior management and issuing payment instructions without authorisation. The court granted the Plaintiff’s application for a worldwide freezing injunction against persons unknown, and ancillary disclosure orders against certain banks who had received the stolen proceeds. CMOC was later affirmed by the UK Supreme Court in Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd.[119]

Taking heed from a local case which is Malaysia’s first case of granting injunctive relief against person unknown – Zschimmer & Schwarz GmbH & Co KG Chemische Fabriken v Persons Unknown & Anor.[120] In this case, the Plaintiff, a German company, was defrauded by unidentified persons to make payments to a bank account in Malaysia, which the Plaintiff thought were genuine commission payments to a South Korean business partner. In granting a proprietary injunction and a freezing injunction against persons unknown, the High Court considered CMOC. Crucially, the court provided the following reasoning:

‘It is not usually the case that a defendant is described as ‘persons unknown’. Nevertheless, the court can grant interlocutory orders against the first defendant — being persons unknown. In cases like the present which involve cyber fraud and fake email addresses, the fraudster or fraudsters are unknown. English case law have allowed for similar injunctive orders against ‘persons unknown’. There is nothing in our Rules of Court 2012 that would prevent the writ of summons and applications from being filed against persons unknown.

As stated above, there is nothing in our Rules of Court 2012 prohibiting the making of an order against persons unknown. In fact, O 89 of the Rules of Court 2012 for summary proceedings for possession of land allows for a defendant reference to persons unknown (see Fauziah bt Ismail & Ors v Lazim bin Kanan & Ors (as person occupying GM 820, Lot 1642, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan without the applicants’ consent) [2013] 5 MLJ 423; [2013] 7 CLJ 37 (CA) the commentary in Foong’s Malaysia Cyber, Electronic Evidence and Information Technology Law, para [8.098] to [8.100]).’[121]

In Zschimmer and referring to Bloomsbury, the person unknown was sufficiently described as:

‘(a) any person or entity who carried out and/or assisted and/or participated in the fraud;

(b) any person or entity who received any of the EUR123,014.65 misappropriated from the plaintiff (including any traceable proceeds thereof) other than in the course of a genuine business transaction with either another defendant or a third party; and

(c) in either case of para 2(i) or (ii), other than by way of the provision of banking facilities.’[122]

Similarly, the Singapore courts have taken the same approach as the UK and Malaysia in basing the claim on sufficiently certain descriptions to identify the defendant. This is evident in CLM v CLN and others[123] where the following description was used: ‘[A]ny person or entity who carried out, participated in or assisted in the theft of the Plaintiff’s Cryptocurrency Assets on or around 8 January 2021, save for the provision of cryptocurrency hosting or trading facilities.’[124]

Since Singapore has replaced the old Rules of Court 2014 with the Rules of Court 2021, the originating application in Form 15 and Form 16 must include both parties’ name and identification number.[125] However, Order 3, Rule 6 states that the practice directions, which contains the relevant forms, ‘must be used with such variations as the circumstances require’.[126] Coupled with the powers of the court to deal with non-compliance with the Rules as set out in Order 3, Rule 2(4),[127] the Singapore High Court in Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person[128] held that the failure to name the Defendant, in the precise manner as stipulated in the relevant forms, did not amount to non-compliance.

In addition, Order 3, Rule 1 states that:

‘Ideals (O.3, r.1)

(1) These Rules are to be given a purposive interpretation.

(2) These Rules seek to achieve the following Ideals in civil procedure:

(a) fair access to justice;

…

(e) fair and practical results suited to the needs of the parties.

(3) The Court must seek to achieve the Ideals in all its orders or directions.

(4) All parties have to assist the Court and to conduct their cases in a manner which will help to achieve the Ideals.’[129]

Hence, the Rules call for a purposive interpretation and the court ‘must seek to achieve the Ideals in all its orders or directions’. Therefore, in Janesh, the Singapore High Court opined that:

‘… requiring strict compliance with the formality requirements of an originating application or claim may well restrict access to justice. … Should a claimant be barred from seeking interim relief, or bringing a claim, unless he is able to name the defendant, instead of using his pseudonym? I think not.’[130]

V. PUTATIVE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OWED BY CRYPTOCURRENCIES NETWORK DEVELOPERS TO CRYPTOCURRENCIES OWNERS

Perhaps it is interesting to discuss the possible existence of a fiduciary relationship between developers of cryptocurrency networks and cryptocurrency owners. Currently, the case under the spotlight of judiciaries across the world and cryptocurrencies developers is Tulip Trading Limited (A Seychelles Company) v Bitcoin Association For BSV[131] (‘Tulip Trading’). The English Court of Appeal granted the appeal and held that the argument that developers of Bitcoin networks owe fiduciary duties to Bitcoin owners had a real chance of success. In other words, it is a serious issue to be tried. Nonetheless, the court did not decide on the actual existence of such duties.

In Tulip Trading, the Plaintiff was unable to access their Bitcoin valued at $4.5 billion following a hack on their account. The Plaintiff argued that the developers ought to have developed a computer code or a patch to transfer the stolen cryptocurrencies to a new address, allowing the rightful owner to regain access to them.[132] Relying on this technical theory, the Plaintiff claimed that as the developers have control over property held by others, they owe fiduciary duties to the rightful owners of the property — specifically, an obligation to develop a patch that enables the Plaintiff to recover the property. According to the Plaintiff, it is this imbalance of power coupled with the property entrusted to the developers that constitute a fiduciary obligation to not compromise the owners’ security.   

The Court of Appeal referred to the rather high threshold as well as the orthodox definition of a fiduciary as set out in Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew[133] as ‘… someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence’ and agreed to the notion held in that case that the list of fiduciary relationships are not exhaustive.[134] Additionally, the Court of Appeal referred to Vivendi SA v Richards[135] that fiduciary relationships are determined on an objective basis.[136]  Hence, viewed objectively, the court opined that the role played by the developers in the exercise of authority and discretionary decision-making on behalf of all the users in the network are characteristic features of fiduciary duties.[137]

With regard to entrustment of property to the developers, the court found that since a bug could only be fixed by the developers and nobody else, this amounts to entrustment.[138] Additionally, the court raised the concept of legitimate expectation that the bitcoin owners have realistic expectations that the developers will not abuse their authority in their own self-interest to the detriment of the owners and that the developers will act in good faith in maintaining the software.[139] However, faced with the vexed situation that the decentralised nature of cryptocurrency networks involves ‘a fluctuating and unidentified body’,[140] the court is unable to come up with a definite conclusion that the common law should expand the rather strict categories of fiduciary relationships.

Having discussed the possible significant developments on the common law concepts of fiduciary and crypto regulation, the Court of Appeal decision is still unsettled. Global attention will be paid to the trial of Tulip Trading set to be held sometime this year. Nevertheless, it is useful to discuss possible consequences of imposing a fiduciary relationship between crypto network developers and users.

Fiduciary relationships are based on trust and confidence in a party to act for the other party’s benefit. A possible argument is that although cryptocurrency networks are said to be 'trustless’, users still place trust in a specified network’s credence and past records when deciding to transact on that network. This shifting of trust does not mean that there is no single iota of trust when transacting in cryptos worth from thousands to billions, particularly since cryptocurrencies are now deemed as property.

The most obvious benefit of imposing such duties is that developers would be required to rigorously assess the ramifications of their policy and technical selections, seek expert advice where necessary, and exercise meticulousness when formulating and scrutinising code and other actions executed on behalf of the blockchain. If, indeed, developers bear obligations towards Bitcoin owners, this could potentially streamline the process of restitution for individuals impacted by digital asset hacks and fraudulent activities. It is easier for victims to recover their assets.

However, perhaps that is easier said than done. Such duties would have a serious impact on developers, given that they have to assume a higher responsibility to anonymous users spread across the globe. This would be an expensive and painstaking task.

In addition, assuming a fiduciary relationship in this case would put the ecosystem of blockchain into question. Blockchain is a decentralised digital ledger that records transactions. Should the existence of a fiduciary relationship be accepted, it would highlight the concentration of authority over Bitcoin ownership within a very small number of individuals. The value of Bitcoin is inherently linked to its autonomy from individual interference. If a protocol alteration that contradicts these core principles were to be implemented, the value of Bitcoin would plunge. In such a scenario, it would be reduced to the authority wielded by the small group responsible for determining its ownership, undermining its intrinsic value.

VI. CONCLUSION

This article has discussed jurisdictional gateways used by the courts in the US, the UK, and Singapore to enforce judgment against persons unknown, with the help of serving of court documents through the medium most likely to reach the defendants ¾ NFTs Airdrop. It is hoped that the aforementioned discussions will provide some clarity and potentially encourage the jurisdiction in Malaysia to adopt a more resolute stance when adjudicating on disputes involving crypto assets. Undeniably, it is also evident that the regulation of crypto assets is still in its early stages, and the harms that have arisen at this nascent stage have been exacerbated by the highly volatile and unregulated crypto market. Additionally, the widespread presence of social media platforms has contributed to the escalation of financial fraud within the cryptocurrency space. Other than the judiciary, this article also recommends Parliament to set up a tailored dispute resolution mechanism for FinTech, much like the existing Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (Act 746) (Malaysia) (‘CIPAA’). Regarding this, due to the in-depth studies and the rapid pace of anticipated changes, staying attuned to such developments poses a considerable challenge for the judicial system. To address this, this article supports the UK Law Commission’s suggestion on the establishment of a panel comprising technical experts who specialise in both cryptocurrency markets and FinTech, legal professionals, scholars, and judges.[141] This collaborative endeavor seeks to offer non-binding insights into intricate and evolving factual and legal matters pertaining to control over specific digital assets ¾ bridging the gap between technical complexity and legal interpretation. Besides that, it could help to ensure consistency in decision-making. The advantage of implementing such a system as shown by the current CIPAA procedures lies in its swift and cost-effective setup, channeling expertise into a select panel of judges who can more effectively stay abreast of pertinent advancements due to their affiliation with a specialised court or division.[142] While challenges remain, a coordinated legal and regulatory approach can pave the way for Malaysia to gradually align with international best practices and ensure a safer, more resilient crypto asset ecosystem.

[1] Lee, S., Lee, J., & Lee, Y. (2023). Dissecting the Terra-LUNA crash: Evidence from the spillover effect and information flow. Finance Research Letters, 53, 103590. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2022.103590>. Site accessed on 3 May 2025.

[2] Patel, R., & Rose, J. (2023, May). A Retrospective on the Crypto Runs of 2022. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Retrieved from <https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/chicago-fed-letter/2023/479>. Site accessed on 4 May 2025.

[3] Hetler, A. (2025, Jan 2). FTX scam explained: Everything you need to know. TechTarget. Retrieved from <https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/feature/FTX-scam-explained-Everything-you-need-to-know#:~:text=The%20total%20assets%20missing%20was,15%2C%202022>. Site accessed on 4 May 2025.

[4] Reuters. (2022, Dec 2). After FTX collapse, pressure builds for tougher crypto rules. Reuters. Retrieved from < https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/after-ftx-collapse-pressure-builds-tougher-crypto-rules-2022-12-02/>. Site accessed on 4 May 2025.

[5] Such as Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) in Malaysia; Federal Reserve System (The Fed) in the United States; Bank of England (BoE) in the United Kingdom.

[6] Financial Stability Board. (2024, Oct 22). Crypto-assets and Global “Stablecoins”. Financial Stability Board. Retrieved from <https://www.fsb.org/work-of-the-fsb/financial-innovation-and-structural-change/crypto-assets-and-global-stablecoins/>. Site accessed on 21 Apr 2025.

[7] PwC. (2022, Jun 28). Demystifying cryptocurrency and digital assets. PwC. Retrieved from <https://www.pwc.com/us/en/tech-effect/emerging-tech/understanding-cryptocurrency-digital-assets.html>. Site accessed on 21 Apr 2025.

[8] Weaver, N. (2022, Dec). The Death of Cryptocurrency: The Case for Regulation. Digital Future Whitepaper Series, Yale Law School. Retrieved from <https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/isp/documents/weaver_death_of_cryptocurrency_final.pdf>. Site accessed on 4 May 2025.

[9] See footnote 8 above.

[10] Narayanan, A., Bonneau, J., Felten, E. W., Miller, A., Goldfeder, S., & Clark, J. (2016). Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies: A Comprehensive Introduction. New Jersey, United States: Princeton University Press.

[11] See footnote 10 above.

[12] Suday, V. (2024, Sept 1). The Backbone of Blockchain: What Are Blockchain Nodes and How Do They Work? MapMetrics. Retrieved from <https://mapmetrics.org/blog/what-are-blockchain-nodes-and-how-do-they-work/>. Site accessed on 4 May 2025.

[13] FBI. (2024, Sept 10). 2023 Cryptocurrency Fraud Report Released. FBI. Retrieved from <https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2023-cryptocurrency-fraud-report-released>. Site accessed on 3 May 2025.

[14] See footnote 8 above.

[15] Chainalysis Team. (2025, Jan 15). 2025 Crypto Crime Trends: Illicit Volumes Portend Record Year as On-Chain Crime Becomes Increasingly Diverse and Professionalized. Chainalysis. Retrieved from <https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2025-crypto-crime-report-introduction/>. Site accessed on 3 May 2025.

[16] Mattackal, L.P. (2025, Feb 15). Crypto scams likely set new record in 2024 helped by AI, Chainalysis says. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/technology/crypto-scams-likely-set-new-record-2024-helped-by-ai-chainalysis-says-2025-02-14/>. Site accessed on 3 May 2025.

[17] Skolnik, S. (2022, May 17). Crypto Lawsuit Deluge Has Big Firms Scrambling to Keep Up. Bloomberg Law. Retrieved from <https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/crypto-lawsuit-explosion-has-big-law-scrambling-to-keep-up>. Site accessed on 3 May 2025.

[18] New Straits Times. (2024, Dec 23). Malaysia first country to enable zakat payments with crypto. New Straits Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2024/12/1152109/malaysia-first-country-enable-zakat-payments-crypto>. Site accessed on 4 May 2025.

[19] Niklas Albakri. (2022, Jun 15). QuickCheck: Is cryptocurrency mining illegal in Malaysia? The Star. Retrieved from <https://www.thestar.com.my/news/true-or-not/2022/06/15/quickcheck-is-cryptocurrency-mining-illegal-in-malaysia#:~:text=NOT%20ILLEGAL&text=It%20is%20perfectly%20legal%20in,pay%20for%20goods%20and%20services>. Site accessed on 2 Aug 2023.

[20] Securities Commission Malaysia. (n.d.). The trading, issuance and safekeeping of Digital Assets in Malaysia are regulated by the Securities Commission. Securities Commission Malaysia. Retrieved from <https://www.sc.com.my/digital-assets>. Site accessed on 4 May 2025.

[21] Adam Aziz. (2017, Sept 19). BNM to provide cryptocurrency guidelines by year end. The Edge Malaysia. Retrieved from <https://theedgemalaysia.com/article/bnm-provide-cryptocurrency-guidelines-year-end>. Site accessed on 4 May 2025.

[22] Securities Commission Malaysia & Bank Negara Malaysia. (2020, Dec 16). BNM and SC’s Joint Response on “Policy confusion over cryptocurrencies”. Securities Commission Malaysia. Retrieved from <https://www.sc.com.my/resources/media/media-release/bnm-and-scs-joint-response-on-policy-confusion-over-cryptocurrencies>. Site accessed on 4 May 2025.

[23] Williams & Glyn’s Bank plc v Astro Dinamico Compania Naviera SA [1984] 1 WLR 438, 442.

[24] In Re Tezos Securities Litigation, Case No. 17-cv-06779-RS (United States District Court N.D.C.A., Aug. 7, 2018).

[25] See footnote 24 above.

[26] Daimler AG v Bauman 571 US 117 (2014).

[27] See footnote 26 above.

[28] International Shoe Co. v Washington 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

[29] See footnote 28 above.

[30] See footnote 28 above.

[31] Boschetto v Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2008).

[32] Schwarzenegger v Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2004).

[33] Jimison, R., & Gold, M. (2025, May 8). Crypto Bill Stalls in the Senate as Democrats Balk. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/08/us/politics/crypto-bill-senate.html>. Site accessed on 9 May 2025.

[34] AK Investment CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2011] UKPC 7.

[35] The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (United Kingdom) (1998 No. 3132 (L. 17)).

[36] Vitkovice Horni A Hutni Tezirstvo v Korner [1951] AC 869.

[37] See footnote 36 above, 877.

[38] Bishop, C. (2024, Nov 11). Is Cryptocurrency Recognised as an Asset in English Courts? Slater Heelis. Retrieved from <https://www.slaterheelis.co.uk/articles/litigation-dispute-resolution-category/is-cryptocurrency-recognised-as-an-asset-in-english-courts/>. Site accessed on 7 May 2025.

[39] Colonial Bank v Whinney [1885] 30 ChD 261.

[40] National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175, 1248.

[41] AA v Persons unknown [2020] 4 WLR.

[42] Wang v Derby [2021] EWHC 3054 (Comm); Ion Science v Persons Unknown (England & Wales Commercial Court, Butcher J, December 21, 2020. Commercial Suit no. CL-2020-000840 Unreported); Fetch.ai Ltd v Persons Unknown [2021] EWHC 2254; Tulip v Van der Laan [2023] EWCA Civ 83.

[43] UK Jurisdiction Taskforce. (2019). Legal Statement on Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts. The LawTech Delivery Panel. Retrieved from <https://www.blockchain4europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/6.6056_JO_Cryptocurrencies_Statement_FINAL_WEB_111119-1.pdf>. Site accessed on 31 July 2023.

[44] See footnote 43 above.

[45] Copytrack Pte Ltd v Wall [2018] BCSC 1709.

[46] Ion Science v Persons Unknown (England & Wales Commercial Court, Butcher J, December 21, 2020. Commercial Suit no. CL-2020-000840 Unreported).

[47] See footnote 43 above.

[48] See footnote 43 above.

[49] See footnote 43 above.

[50] Tulip v Van der Laan [2023] EWCA Civ 83.

[51] Dickinson, A. (2019). Cryptocurrencies in Public and Private Law. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 5, 108.

[52] Fetch.ai Ltd v Persons Unknown [2021] EWHC 2254.

[53] Fetch.ai Ltd v Persons Unknown 24 ITELR 566, 571.  

[54] D’Aloia v Persons Unknown [2022] EWHC 1723.

[55] See footnote 54 above, paragraph 10.

[56] Osbourne v Persons Unknown [2023] EWHC 39.

[57] See footnote 52 above.

[58] See footnote 56 above, paragraph 36.

[59] See footnote 56 above.

[60] See footnote 56 above, paragraph 33.

[61] See footnote 56 above, paragraph 43.

[62] See footnote 56 above, paragraph 37.

[63] Siemens AG v Holdrich Investment Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 1007, paragraph 7.

[64] Rules of Court 2014 (No. S 71) (Singapore). 

[65] Rules of Court 2021 (No. S 914) (Singapore).

[66] Zoom Communications Ltd v Broadcast Solutions Pte Ltd [2014] SGCA 44.

[67] See footnote 65 above, o 11, r 1.

[68] Ninemia Maritime Corporation v Trave Schiffahrtgesellschaft GmbH [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 600 at 605.

[69] Bouvier, Yves Charles Edgar and another v Accent Delight International Ltd and another and another appeal [2015] SGCA 45, 151.

[70] Derby v Weldon (No 1) [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep 122, 64A–64B.

[71] Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460.

[72] Yeo, T. M. (2019). Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore: Conflict of Laws. Singapore: LexisNexis, paragraph 75.093.

[73] See footnote 72 above, paragraph 75.091.

[74] See footnote 72 above, paragraph 75.094.

[75] Amchem Products Inc v British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board) [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897.

[76] Club Mediterranee NZ v Wendell CA82/87 [1987] NZCA 120.

[77] SPH v SA (Formerly known as SA) [2014] HKCFA 56.

[78] Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v Bhavani Stores Pte Ltd [1997] 3 SLR(R) 363, 16.

[79] Société Générale de Paris v Dreyfus Brothers (1885) 29 Ch D 239, 242–243.

[80] See footnote 65 above, o 8, r 1.

[81] Ardavan Arzandeh. (2022). The New Rules of Court and the Service-Out Jurisdiction in Singapore. Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 191, 196.

[82] See footnote 81 above, 197.

[83] CLM v CLN and others [2022] SGHC 46.

[84] Bradley Lomas Electrolok Ltd and another v Colt Ventilation East Asia Pte Ltd and others [1999] 3 SLR(R) 1156, 19-20.

[85] See footnote 63 above.

[86] See footnote 63 above, paragraph 8.

[87] Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person [2022] SGHC 264.

[88] See footnote 87 above, paragraph 30.

[89] Bouvier, Yves Charles Edgar and another v Accent Delight International Ltd and another and another appeal [2015] 5 SLR 558, 143-164.

[90] American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396.

[91] See footnote 40 above.

[92] Ruscoe v Cryptopia Ltd (in Liquidation) [2020] NZHC 728.

[93] See footnote 92 above, paragraph 127.

[94] Aksoy, P. C., & Ozkan, Z. (2021). NFTs and Copyright: Challenges and Opportunities. Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 16(10), 1115, 1115.

[95] Soleymani v Nifty Gateway LLC [2022] EWHC 773, 9.

[96] See footnote 92 above, paragraph 58.

[97] See footnote 83 above, paragraph 47.

[98] See footnote 83 above, paragraph 48.

[99] See footnote 87 above, paragraph 80.

[100] ‘Where it appears to the court that there is a good reason to authorise service by a method or at a place not otherwise permitted by this Part, the court may make an order permitting service by an alternative method or at an alternative place.’

[101] Rules of Court 2012 (P.U. (A) 205/2012) (Malaysia) o 62, r 5.

[102] See footnote 65 above, o 8, r 2.

[103] CMOC Sales & Marketing Ltd v Persons Unknown [2018] EWHC 2230 (Comm).

[104] Gray v Hurley [2019] EWHC 1636.

[105] Pastel. (2023, April 6). NFT Airdrops Explained: What Are They &... Pastel. Retrieved from <https://pastel.network/nft-airdrops-explained-what-are-they-how-do-they-work/>. Site accessed on 17 July 2023.

[106] See footnote 105 above.

[107] LCX AG v John Doe Nos. 1-25 (Docket No. 154644/2022).

[108] See footnote 54 above.

[109] See footnote 54 above.

[110] Jones v Persons Unknown [2022] EWCH 2543.

[111] Benjamin Arthur Bowen v Xingzhao Li (Case No. 23-cv-20399).

[112] Yaffe-Bellany, D. (2022, Mar 2). Millions for Crypto Start-ups, No Real Names Necessary. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/technology/cryptocurrency-anonymity-alarm.html>. Site accessed on 2 Jun 2023.

[113] See footnote 41 above, paragraph 34.

[114] Bloomsbury Publishing Group Ltd and another v News Group Newspapers Ltd and others [2003] 1 WLR 1633.

[115] See footnote 114 above, paragraph 16, 19.

[116] See footnote 114 above, paragraph 21.

[117] CMOC v Persons Unknown [2017] EWHC 3599 (Comm).

[118] See footnote 117 above, paragraph 4.

[119] Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd [2019] 3 All ER 1.

[120] Zschimmer & Schwarz GmbH & Co KG Chemische Fabriken v Persons Unknown & Anor [2021] 7 MLJ 178.

[121] See footnote 120 above, paragraph 40, 49.

[122] See footnote 120 above, paragraph 42.

[123] See footnote 83 above.

[124] See footnote 83 above, paragraph 34.

[125] See footnote 65 above, o 6, r 11.

[126] See footnote 65 above, o 3, r 6.

[127] See footnote 65 above, o 3, r 2(4).

[128] See footnote 87 above, paragraph 37. 

[129] See footnote 65 above, o 3, r 1.

[130] See footnote 87 above, paragraph 38.

[131] Tulip Trading Ltd v Bitcoin Association for BSV [2022] EWHC 667.

[132] See footnote 131 above, paragraph 40.

[133] Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1, 18A-C.

[134] See footnote 131 above.

[135] Vivendi SA v Richards [2013] EWHC 3006 (Ch), 139.

[136] See footnote 131 above, paragraph 48.

[137] See footnote 131 above, paragraph 86.

[138] See footnote 131 above, paragraph 78. 

[139] See footnote 131 above, paragraph 79.

[140] See footnote 131 above, paragraph 77.

[141] Law Commissioners. (2023, Jun 27). Digital Assets: Final Report. Law Commission. Retrieved from <https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/digital-assets/>. Site accessed on 16 Aug 2023.

[142] Hoe, C. K. (2023, Oct 2). CIPAA Procedure for Construction Disputes - CIPAA Malaysia. CIPAA Malaysia. Retrieved from <https://www.cipaamalaysia.com/blog/cipaa-procedure#Advantages_of_CIPAA_procedures>. Site accessed on 18 Mar 2024.