I.      INTRODUCTION

The bill in question, officially referred to as the Mufti (Federal Territories) Bill 2024 (‘the Bill’), was proposed by Dato’ Setia Dr Haji Mohd Na’im, the Minister of Religious Affairs. It was tabled in Parliament and had its first reading in July 2024. The second and third readings are yet to be conducted as of the publication date of this article. The proposal has recently come under scrutiny, prompting debates among both Muslim and non-Muslim communities, drawing voices from various quarters, including monarchs, prominent Islamic scholars, Muslim NGOs, influential Malay lawyers, and communities in East Malaysia.

Before the author delves into the intricacies of the Bill, it is vital that the reader first understand certain Islamic terminologies pertinent to the discussion of this Bill.

A.    What Is a Mufti?

The Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia defined the term mufti by its literal translation, which means ‘giver of fatwas’.[1] A more general definition of a mufti would be a consultant in Islamic law who issues a ruling to clarify any issues in Muslim society.[2] Historically, muftis are learned Islamic juries who fulfil their role by educating the public on emerging issues that lack explicit guidance in Islamic texts through the issuance of a fatwa.[3]

B.    What Is a Fatwa?

A fatwa is a legal ruling issued by a mufti on an Islamic matter that requires clarification.[4] Although these rulings are authoritative and historically have played a major role in policy-making, it's important to note that it is never meant to be legally binding.[5] If the person who requests the fatwas finds it unconvincing, they are permitted to seek another opinion.[6]

II.   GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE BILL

To give the reader a more objective and comprehensive image of the Mufti (Federal Territories) Bill 2024, a part-by-part overview of the main provisions within the Bill will be presented. The Bill consists of 9 parts and represents a significant step in shaping the governance and administration of Islamic law within the Federal Territories. This overview highlights the key provisions of the Bill, focusing on its scope, structure, and implications.

A. Part II: Mufti and Deputy Mufti

The Bill formalises the appointment and roles of the Mufti and Deputy Mufti. Clause 3 outlines their qualifications, which includes requiring Malaysian citizenship, adherence to the Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah doctrine, and expertise in Islamic law.[7] Clause 4 establishes the Mufti as the chief authority on Islamic law in the Federal Territories, advising the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (‘YDPA’).[8] Clauses 5 to 6 outline provisions that also address the revocation and resignation of officeholders, ensuring transparency in appointments.[9]

B. Part III: Fatwa Committee

The Bill establishes the Fatwa Committee under Clause 7, chaired by the Mufti and composed of representatives from relevant Islamic and legal institutions.[10] Clause 8 sets out its functions, including discussing Islamic legal issues and issuing fatwas.[11]

C.    Part IV: Issuance of Fatwa

The procedure for issuing fatwas is detailed in Clause 10, requiring research and deliberation by the Fatwa Committee before obtaining the YDPA’s assent.[12] Notably, this process bypasses parliamentary involvement. Clause 11 makes fatwas binding on Muslims in the Federal Territories and recognisable by all courts,[13] while Clause 12 allows amendments or revocations of existing fatwas.[14] Clause 13 provides a special process for fatwas affecting national interest.[15]

D.    Part V: Determination of Qibla Direction

Qibla refers to the geographical direction of worship facing towards the Ka’ba, the holiest site in Islam, which is important for Islamic rituals.[16] Clause 17 empowers the Mufti to determine and verify the qibla direction,[17] ensuring accuracy for religious observances. The unauthorised issuance, determination or intentional alteration of the qibla direction would constitute an offence under Clause 18, which provide penalties for violation.[18]

E.    Part VI-VIII: Committees for Islamic Affairs

In its efforts to strengthen the existing legal structure for the administration of Islamic Law, the Bill establishes three specialised committees. First is the establishment of the Falak Syarie Committee, which, among other responsibilities, oversees astronomical calculations for prayer times and the Islamic calendar.[19] The second would be the establishment of the Rukyah Hilal Committee,[20] which determines the Islamic months of Ramadan, Syawal, and Zulhijah through moon sightings.[21] Lastly, the establishment of the Islamic Religious Teaching Supervisory Committee regulates the teaching of Islam and issues Islamic teaching certifications (tauliah).[22]

III. THE PURPOSE AND UNDERLYING MOTIVES OF THE BILL

The Bill, while aiming to streamline the governance and administration of Islamic law, has sparked considerable debate among legal experts, religious scholars, and the public. Several key clauses, such as the binding nature of fatwas, the Mufti’s legal immunity, and the emphasis on Sunni orthodoxy, have raised questions about the necessity and implications of such provisions. This section examines the objectives behind the introduction of the Bill, highlights the perspectives of influential figures who support it, and explores its intended role in strengthening Islamic governance within the Federal Territories.

A. To Provide a Clear Definition of Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah

The Bill seeks to establish a clear definition of Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah, the mainstream and majority tradition of Islam, commonly abbreviated as Sunni Islam, in accordance with the Al-Asyairah and Al-Maturidiah theological schools.[23] The direct translation of Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah is ‘the people of the Sunnah (tradition of the Prophet Muhammad) and of the community’, referring to Muslims who adhere to the practices and beliefs established by the Prophet and upheld by his companions and early generations of Islamic scholars.[24]

Now, this begs the question: why does the government find the need to provide a clear definition of Sunni Islam through legislation? Sunni Islam, or Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah, represents the dominant school of thought among Muslims in Malaysia and plays a big role in their day-to-day life.[25] By providing a clear definition, it ensures that Islamic rulings, fatwas, and teachings align with an agreed-upon theological framework. This helps maintain consistency in religious administration and reduces the risk of conflicting interpretations.[26] Moreover, it can be implied that the Bill, in a way, sets a standard for what constitutes mainstream Islamic practice, offering clear guidance for Muslims while discouraging the proliferation of unauthorised or fringe ideologies.

Under the current system, the absence of a legally codified definition of Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah can lead to several challenges. Namely, without a clear framework, there will be room for differing interpretations, potentially causing confusion within the Muslim community.[27] In extreme cases, it can lead to sectarian divides, as seen in other parts of the world.[28] Additionally, Muftis and Fatwa Committees may face difficulties in ensuring their rulings are accepted universally among Muslims, as the theological basis might be questioned due to varying understandings of Sunni Islam.

An interesting point that many often overlook is the positive implication that can be felt by even non-Muslims. By standardising Sunni Islam through Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah, the Bill reduces the risk of extremist ideologies gaining traction in Malaysia. This benefits society as a whole by fostering moderation and discouraging polarising religious narratives. When Islamic governance operates within a clear and unified framework, it strengthens the capacity for peaceful coexistence in a multi-religious society.

The government’s past efforts to curb the spread of Islamic teachings that do not align with the mainstream interpretation of Islam were conspicuous in events such as the 1996 fatwa banning Shi’ism, which was subsequently gazetted into law on 9 February 1996.[29] This was done to protect national security[30] and to prevent religious sectarian conflicts evident in countries like Syria and Iraq.[31] These countries, plagued by sectarian violence, highlight how divergent religious narratives can destabilise the whole country, with far-reaching impacts affecting both Muslims and non-Muslims. Thus, this can be viewed as a preventive measure to ease similar tensions that are crucial for maintaining national security and social cohesion.

B. Empowering the Mufti with a Structured and Legally Binding Framework

A more structured framework for the Mufti is established through Clauses 3, 7, 19 and 22 of the Bill, allowing for efficiency in the Mufti administering Islamic Law in the Federal Territories. The Bill formalises the roles of the Mufti and Deputy Mufti, ensuring that appointees meet stringent qualifications, including adherence to the Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah doctrine and expertise in Islamic law.[32] It establishes a Fatwa Committee to support the Mufti in issuing fatwas.[33] The committee includes representatives from Islamic and legal institutions, ensuring diverse input and accountability.[34]

The importance of a structured framework is often undermined. It is asserted that it will ensure administrative efficiency. By delegating specific responsibilities to specialised committees, the Bill ensures the smooth functioning of Islamic governance. This Bill should also be lauded for clearly defining the intricate roles and processes in the system, as it reflects a strong degree of transparency and reduces ambiguity.

Additionally, the Mufti is further empowered through Clauses 11-13 of the Bill, which outlines the legally binding nature of fatwas on Muslims in the Federal Territories, along with the authoritative and enforceable nature of fatwas in all courts.[35] The establishment of the Fatwa Committee,[36] which is chaired by the Mufti, allows for the amendment or revocation of any previous fatwas.[37] The Mufti, through the Fatwa Committee and the Muzakarah Committee, can issue fatwas on matters of national interest, provided there is consultation with relevant authorities and the assent of the YDPA.[38]

   This part seems to be the main point of contention for many, who argue that it might be slightly overreaching. Nevertheless, the binding nature of fatwas received much support, mainly from Malay conservative communities, as it aligns with Malaysia’s Sunni orthodoxy values.[39] Moreover, the support largely stems from the perceived consistency in religious governance that it will bring as it creates a uniform standard of Islamic legal rulings for Muslims in the Federal Territories. Furthermore, certain conservative quarters asserted that this would help prevent deviant teachings that don’t align with mainstream Sunni Islam, thereby safeguarding religious unity.[40]

C. Support from Influential Figures

1. Chairman of Rabithah Alawiyah Malaysia (‘RAM’), Datuk Syed Hood Syed Edros Al-Aydrus:

He hopes that the Bill will pass without amendments in the Dewan Rakyat, as he deemed the provisions as highly relevant in uniting diverse communities. He further states that as a nationwide NGO focused on comprehensive Islamic outreach, RAM fully supports the Bill’s tabling and encourages its members across the country to pray and advocate for its approval.[41]

2. Leader of the National Trust Party (Amanah), Ustaz Datuk Seri Ahmad Awang:

He states that the Bill would help prevent Malaysia from experiencing the sectarian divisions seen in Indonesia, where Muslims are split into numerous sects. He mentioned that in Indonesia, Friday prayers are sometimes held twice to accommodate different sects. It also noted that a similar practice occurred in Perlis in the past but was later halted by the state government.[42]

3. Twelve State Muftis:

The Bill has received strong backing from 12 out of 14 state Muftis, reflecting significant support from religious authorities.[43]

4. Pro-Ash'ari Networks:

Groups such as the Association of Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah Malaysia (Aswaja) and the Sarawak Scholars’ Association (Ittihad) have expressed support for the Bill, aligning with its emphasis on traditional Sunni doctrine.[44]

5. Dr Haji Abdul Ghani bin Ahmad:

During the parliamentary debate on the Bill, the Member of Parliament for Jerlun, Dr Haji Abdul Ghani bin Ahmad, referenced the Bill while discussing the liberalisation of Islam in Malaysia. He remarked: ‘Among the deteriorations increasingly taking root among ignorant Muslims is the infiltration of liberal Islamic ideology, which is spreading silently and rapidly across various segments of society. Liberal ideology is increasingly influencing the mindset of Muslims in our country.’[45]

   He further referenced the Muzakarah Ulama held on 13 June 2006 in Perak, where the Mufti and Islamic scholars had criticised liberal Islamic ideology, deeming it contrary to Islamic principles.[46] However, proponents of liberal Islam rejected their views, accusing the Mufti and scholars of being rigid, outdated, and narrow-minded.[47] They argued that Quranic verses should be reinterpreted to align with modern times, questioned Allah’s laws and principles with rational arguments and opposed the enforcement of moral laws based on religion.[48]

IV.  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN THE BILL AND EXISTING LAWS

Supporters of the Federal Territories Mufti Bill 2024 often reiterate that this Bill merely reinforces similarly enacted laws, thus implying that the narrative of its ‘overreach’ doesn’t hold water. Among the laws that often get compared to it are the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 (‘Act 505’) and the Sabah Fatwa Enactment 2004 (‘the Enactment’), which address critical aspects of Islamic law governance in Malaysia. This analysis examines the powers of the Mufti, issuance procedures, the legal status of fatwas, and unique governance structures to provide a deeper understanding of the legislative frameworks.

A. The Federal Territories Mufti Bill 2024 vs. Act 505

1. Powers of the Mufti

In terms of the Mufti’s authority, both pieces of legislation outline similar scopes. The Bill states that the Mufti shall aid the YDPA and shall be the primary authority on Islamic law,[49] while Act 505 similarly outlined that the Mufti advises the YDPA and serves as the chief authority after the Agong.[50] However, the distinction lies in its clarity. The Bill explicitly defines the Mufti’s role within a structured hierarchy of Islamic law governance, whereas Act 505 lacks the procedural clarity and committee-backed decisions emphasised in the Bill.

The Bill also reinforces the Mufti’s authority by mandating the formation of multiple committees, such as the Fatwa Committee[51] and the Rukyah Hilal Committee.[52] Compared to these committees, the bodies established by Act 505 are arguably more limited in scope. For instance, Act 505 establishes the Islamic Legal Consultative Committee to discuss proposed fatwas, making its role largely advisory.[53] In contrast, the Fatwa Committee holds greater authority, as it is directly responsible for issuing and formalising fatwas.[54]

2. Issuance and legal status of fatwas

In terms of the clarity of the process of issuing a fatwa, the Bill establishes a transparent process, requiring the Mufti to directly research, convene the Fatwa Committee, and seek assent from the YDPA before publication.[55] This procedural rigour helps minimise the risk of arbitrary or uninformed decisions. Similarly, for fatwas to be gazetted under Act 505, the Mufti shall call ​a meeting with the Islamic Legal Consultative Committee to discuss the proposed fatwa before publication,[56] and may direct any person to conduct research or a study before issuing a fatwa.[57] The Bill also introduces a procedure for issuing fatwas involving national interest, emphasising coordination with the Muzakarah Committee for fatwas affecting national interest.[58] In contrast, Act 505 does not address such scenarios, reflecting its more localised focus​.

Regarding the legal status of fatwas, both laws render gazetted fatwas binding on Muslims within their jurisdictions and recognised by all courts.[59] However, while Act 505 explicitly stipulates that no fatwa shall be binding unless it is published in the Gazette,[60] the Bill noticeably lacks such clarity. Instead, it simply states that rulings of Islamic law which are not published in the Gazette shall hold a respected and guiding status for Muslims in the Federal Territories,[61] which could lead to differing interpretations of its authority. Act 505 also carries a specific provision which permits Muslims to depart from gazetted fatwa in matters of personal observance, belief or opinion,[62] an admirable aspect that the Bill is ultimately silent on.

3. Additional governance structure

In addition to the establishment of the Fatwa Committee[63] and the Rukyah Hillal Committee[64] to aid in a multitude of aspects of Islamic governance, the Bill also introduces specialised bodies like the Falak Syarie Committee,[65] ensuring decisions on astronomical matters are made systematically​. Act 505, while comprehensive, does not include such specific provisions, focusing more broadly on administration.​

B. The Federal Territories Mufti Bill 2024 vs. The Enactment

1. Powers of the Mufti

With respect to the powers of the Mufti, both pieces of legislation differ in their state-specific requirements. The Bill emphasises national oversight, with the Mufti operating under the YDPA’s authority.[66] In contrast, the Enactment is more adapted to Sabah’s unique context by requiring the Mufti to have ‘Sabah connections’,[67] ensuring representation of local interests​. Both the Bill and Enactment recognise the Mufti as the chief authority on Islamic law, aiding their respective heads of state.[68]

2. Issuance and legal status of fatwas

In terms of the process and structure of issuing a fatwa, the Bill relies on the Fatwa Committee and the YDPA’s assent.[69] The Enactment, on the other hand, requires fatwas to be deliberated by the State Fatwa Council, Majlis Ugama Islam Negeri Sabah,[70] and assent from the Yang di-Pertua Negeri.[71] For fatwas that affect national interest, the Enactment has a more rigorous procedure. The Enactment provides a comprehensive mechanism for such fatwas, involving referral to the Jawatankuasa Muzakarah and the Conference of Rulers.[72] While the Bill contains a similar provision,[73] it lacks the detailed referral process seen in Sabah’s Enactment. Regarding the legal status of fatwas, both laws stipulate that gazetted fatwas are binding and court-recognised.[74] However, similar to Act 505, the Enactment allows for Muslims to depart from gazetted fatwa in matters of personal observance, belief or opinion,[75] an aspect that the Bill is silent on.

3. Additional governance structure

The Bill includes specialised committees for determining the qibla direction and supervising religious teachings.[76] The Enactment lacks such specialised bodies, as it focuses on contextual nuances, such as the need for Muftis to understand laws specific to Sabah.[77]

C. Key Observations

The Bill seems to be more structured, reflecting contemporary governance needs, while Act 505 adopts a simpler approach suitable for its time. The Enactment, on the other hand, emphasises state-specific elements like ‘Sabah connections,’ balancing local interests with federal oversight. It is submitted that the Bill should emulate the Enactment’s detailed procedure on issuing fatwas that affect national interest as it sets a useful benchmark for handling such critical matters.

In contrast to the Enactment and Act 505, the Bill is lacking in two critical aspects. First, the wording of clause 11 of the Bill[78] that outlines the nature of a fatwa is not as precise compared to the Enactment and Act 505, which explicitly states that a fatwa only becomes binding upon publication in the gazette.[79] Secondly, the ability of Muslims to depart from gazetted fatwas in matters of personal observance, belief or opinion, noticeably remains absent in the Bill and reflects a critical lack of oversight.

V.    CONCERNS REGARDING THE BILL

Despite the government’s assurance that this Bill is purely to strengthen the framework of the Mufti and won’t have any delirious effects, valid concerns were still raised regarding the Bill.

A.    It Represents a Fundamental Attack on Personal Liberties

Detractors argue that the Bill poses a threat to individual freedoms, particularly concerning the binding nature of fatwas. The Bill, if passed, would grant Muftis the power to issue fatwas with a legally binding status that is to be accepted by all courts, not just limited to Syariah Courts.[80] Taking into consideration that this will be done with no parliamentary oversight and lack of clarity as to whether only gazetted fatwas or fatwas, in general, are binding, it essentially transforms fatwas from advisory opinions into a law that is to be abided by all Muslims.

The issuance of certain fatwas has sparked debates about their impact on personal liberties and religious practices. In the past, fatwas had been issued to prohibit activities such as the ‘Pokémon Go’ mobile game,[81] heavy metal,[82] Wayang Kulit[83] (a traditional Malay art performance), practising yoga,[84] beauty queen pageants,[85] adults playing with Teddy bears,[86] wearing fake nails,[87] free mixing between men and women,[88] and many more.

These fatwas have been criticised for violating basic human rights and for limiting every aspect of a Muslim’s life. It was asserted that the fatwas not only promote radicalisation, but they also foster intolerance among Muslims. However, as was said before, in the past, these previous fatwas were merely an opinion issued by Muftis with no legal enforcement. Thus, it remains fair for the critics of the Bill to raise this concern on the binding nature of fatwas, with some going as far as to correlate it with a step towards religious authoritarianism.[89] This group asserted that the Mufti and the Deputy Mufti, along with the support of newly established specialised Islamic committees, ‘further consolidate religious authority into a state-driven apparatus and will be shielded from legal accountability.’[90] 

B.    It Divides the People Through Sectarianism

The Bill mandates that the Mufti and Deputy Mufti must adhere exclusively to the Sunni creed.[91] While this is intended to maintain religious uniformity, this requirement could arguably marginalise non-Sunni interpretations, such as Shia and Ahmadi views, which are often deemed deviant in Malaysia.[92] This exclusivity may foster sectarian divisions and perpetuate bigotry, undermining the nation's commitment to religious inclusivity. The Freedom of Thought Report 2023 highlights that state preference for a particular religion can reinforce societal prejudice and discrimination against minority beliefs.[93]

  As stated earlier, the fatwas issued would disproportionately be based on the predominant Shafi’i school of Sunni Islam.[94] It is submitted that this will perpetuate sectarianism and directly undermine Muslims who practice different interpretations of Sunni Islam, such as Hanbali, Hanafi, and Maliki.[95] This is because even though Malaysia's Muslim population is predominantly Sunni, with the Shafi'i school being the most widely followed, there are still communities and individuals who practice other Sunni interpretations.[96] The Bill's exclusive focus on the Shafi'i school could lead to widespread marginalisation as fatwas and religious directives issued under the Bill may not consider the jurisprudential nuances of other Sunni schools, potentially sidelining their practices and interpretations as a whole. By institutionalising a single school of thought, the Bill may inadvertently foster divisions among Sunni Muslims, undermining unity and diversity within the Muslim community.

Proponents of the Bill pointed out that the concerns raised with regard to sectarianism are far-fetched as the Bill still allows for the practising of different interpretations of Sunni Islam if rendered necessary for public interest.[97] However, it is equally important to point out that the term “public interest” is not properly defined. The vague nature of "public interest" leaves room for subjective interpretation, which could result in inconsistent application and potential bias against non-Shafi'i practices.

Without clear guidelines, this exception may offer inadequate protection for followers of other Sunni schools, failing to ensure their religious practices are respected and accommodated. While the Bill aims to maintain religious uniformity, its exclusive focus on the Shafi'i school and the ambiguous provisions in Section 16 could marginalise followers of other Sunni interpretations, fostering sectarian divisions and undermining Malaysia's commitment to religious inclusivity.

C.    Unconstitutional

The Bill has been criticised for its potential conflict with the Federal Constitution, particularly in its provisions that allow fatwas to carry the force of law without parliamentary scrutiny.[98] This raises concerns about breaches of constitutional articles concerning the separation of powers, legislative authority, and judicial independence.

1.     Separation of powers

On the grounds of separation of powers, Article 44 of the Federal Constitution vests legislative power in Parliament.[99] Critics argue that the Bill bypasses the legislative process by granting fatwas issued by the Mufti the status of legally binding rules without requiring parliamentary approval under Clause 11 of the Bill.[100] This centralisation of lawmaking power within a religious office undermines the principle of separation of powers, where laws should be enacted through democratic processes involving elected representatives.​

2.     Judicial authority

Article 121 of the Federal Constitution establishes the jurisdiction of the civil and Syariah courts,[101] empowering them to interpret and apply the law. However, clause 11(b) of the Bill mandates that fatwas are recognised by all courts as authoritative in matters stated within them.[102] This could potentially be interpreted to limit courts’ judicial oversight and infringe upon their independence, as they are bound to follow religious rulings that are not subject to judicial review or constitutional scrutiny​.

3.     Religious freedom

Article 11 of the Federal Constitution guarantees every individual the right to profess and practise their religion.[103] By compelling Muslims to abide by fatwas as legally binding religious duties under Clause 11(a) of the Bill,[104] the Bill may infringe upon personal religious autonomy, especially for those who interpret Islamic teachings differently from the Sunni orthodoxy emphasised in the Bill​.

4.     Role of the YDPA

Article 3 of the Federal Constitution designates the YDPA as the head of Islam in the Federal Territories.[105] The Bill’s provisions centralising fatwa issuance and empowering the Mufti through the newly established specialised Islamic committee may diminish the powers traditionally held by the Agong and encroach upon his constitutional role in Islamic governance.  

D.    Appointment of The Mufti and The Mufti’s Prerogative

The lack of transparency on the qualification and merit-based appointment of a Mufti has drawn huge backlash. Historically speaking, Muftis were learned Islamic scholars and jurists who engaged in open discussion regarding a topic which is in contention among Muslims, and after a consensus was drawn, a fatwa would be issued.[106] These fatwas were purely opinions with no legally binding status, and the person who inquired is permitted to seek a second opinion. However, Latheefa Koya, the former Chief Commissioner for the MACC, pointed out in an interview that in Malaysia, Muftis are civil servants appointed by the government; they are paid a salary.[107] This is an overt conflict of interest, potentially leading to biases in their issuance of a fatwa. She further asserted that this would lead to the Muftis being loyal to the government of the day with no room to form independent rulings.[108] Additionally, in the same interview with Latheefa Koya, she asserted that the Bill may enable fatwas to serve political agendas.[109] She argued that if a government wants to be perceived as more Islamic to woo votes from conservative communities, it could leverage the Muftis as a political tool.[110] This risks transforming the fatwas from being purely advisory and independent into politically motivated statements.[111]

Furthermore, many scrutinise the Bill for essentially allowing fatwas issued by Muftis to have certain immunities and protections, making the legal protection of Muftis comparable with the notion that judges can’t be sued for their rulings.[112] Clause 32 of the Bill grants the Mufti immunity from legal proceedings for actions taken in good faith under the Bill.[113] This provision mirrors protections commonly afforded to public servants, such as in Section 2 of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948,[114] which is also referenced to in Clause 33 of the Bill.[115] However, critics contend that this level of immunity may encourage unaccountability, as there are no explicit checks and balances to prevent abuse of power​.[116] With legal immunity, the Mufti can issue fatwas and exercise powers under the Bill without fear of legal repercussions as long as actions are deemed to be in ‘good faith’. Moreover, there are no clear mechanisms to challenge or appeal fatwas that may infringe upon individual rights or constitutional provisions, which could lead to arbitrary decision-making.

E.    Oppositions From Influential Figures

1.     Perlis Mufti, Datuk Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin:

A strong critic of the Bill, Datuk Mohd Asri stated that the government should refrain from enacting laws or regulations that limit critical thinking, suppress intellectual and academic freedoms, or undermine freedom of thought, particularly under the pretext of religion. The Madani Government ought to embrace a more inclusive and progressive approach that encourages open, civil, and broad-minded discourse.[117]

2.     Sultan of Perlis, Tuanku Syed Sirajuddin:

The Sultan stated that he supported Datuk Mohd Asri’s statement and refused consent to the Conference of Rulers to be named as a supporter of the Bill.[118]

3.     President of Islamist Party PAS, Tan Sri Abdul Hadi Awang:

He urged a review of the Bill, questioning the justification for establishing an ‘official’ Islamic doctrine. He highlighted that prominent Islamic scholars such as Imam Malik, Imam Shafi'i, Imam Abu Hanifa, and Imam Hanbali have never advocated for their teachings to be enforced as a national framework. Instead, their guidance focused on Islam being recognised as the religion of the state without mandating adherence to a single theological school.[119]

4.     Former Law Minister, Datuk Zaid Ibrahim:

He largely contested the Bill, stating that eventually, it would result in ‘the whole Federation being ruled by Muftis’. He further argued that the Bill infringes on people’s personal liberties and constitutional rights, such as eating wherever you please, religious freedoms, shaking hands with a female colleague, and wishing Merry Christmas or Happy Deepavali.[120]

5.     Founder of the Islamic Renaissance Front, Ahmad Farouk Musa:

He argued that the Bill imposes a restrictive theological position, leaving no space for differing beliefs or interpretations. It effectively eliminates the freedom of conscience, requiring all Muslims to conform to the state's prescribed theology. Despite claims of promoting diversity, the bill undermines it by enforcing a single, state-mandated religious viewpoint.[121]

6.     A women’s rights group, Sisters in Islam (‘SIS’):

Cautioned that making fatwas legally binding could lead to penalties for actions that are not considered crimes under secular law. Traditionally, fatwas serve as advisory opinions, offering guidance to Muslims on religious issues, rather than being enforced as statutory laws.[122]

VI. CONCLUSION

The tabling of the Federal Territories Mufti Bill 2024 has ignited widespread debate, reflecting its profound implications on governance, religious authority, and personal freedoms. While detractors voice concerns about its potential unconstitutionality, encroachment on individual liberties, and its impact on Malaysia's constitutional monarchy, proponents argue that the Bill strengthens the role of Islamic governance and ensures uniformity in religious administration. The intense reactions underscore the importance of engaging in a balanced and healthy discourse.

A critical yet open-minded approach is necessary to unpack the nuances of the Federal Territories Mufti Bill 2024. The government has an opportunity to reflect on the feedback received and, if needed, make amendments to ensure the Bill not only respects the diversity of Islamic practices in Malaysia but also upholds democratic principles. Such deliberation is essential to foster a legal framework that is just, inclusive, and aligned with the nation's foundational ethos.